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Abstract
This study is a detailed analysis of Speculation Game, a minimal agent-based
model of financial markets, in which the round-trip trading and the dynamic
wealth evolution with variable trading volumes are implemented. Instead of
herding behavior, we find that the emergence of volatility clustering can be
induced by the heterogeneous wealth distribution among traders. In particular,
the spontaneous redistribution of market wealth through repetitions of round-
trip trades can widen the wealth disparity and establish the Pareto distribution
of the capital size. In the meantime, large fluctuations in price return are
brought on by the intermittent placements of the relatively big orders from
rich traders. Empirical data are used to support the scenario derived from the
model.
Keywords: Financial stylized facts, Multi-agent simulation, Round-trip
trading, Wealth distribution, Pareto’s law
1. Introduction
The time series of financial asset returns are known to have a set of nontrivial
quantitative and qualitative properties collectively called as the stylized facts
[1]. One of the representative features is volatility clustering, a jargon related
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to the inclination of large fluctuations in price returns to form clusters, which
results in a long time tail (often observed as either a power-law or a logarithmic
function) in the decay of autocorrelation of volatility [2, 3, 4]. Moreover, those
clusters burst intermittently over a wide spectrum of time scales [1, 2, 5] so that
the temporal structure of price returns can be considered as fractals featuring
with the absence of characteristic time scale [6]. As the volatility clustering can
be observed in the different markets and instruments, it attracts the interest
from many researchers, especially econophysicists, who are enthusiastic about
discovering such a universality class and comprehending the mechanism behind.
Stochastic processes, which are standard models in the financial and econo-
metric fields, have been used to describe the volatility clustering at the aggre-
gated level. The representative models are the autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedas-
ticity (GARCH) processes, both of which can reproduce the aperiodic bursts in
returns 1 [2, 7]. Typically, these models are useful for practical analyses of
empirical data, whereas they do not take account of endogenous factors at the
microscopic level of financial markets.
On the other hand, bottom-up approaches, such as agent-based models,
are favored in the econophysics field because the cause for the emergence of
volatility clustering can be captured more easily with the explicit description of
the interaction among traders. Several types of very simple agent-based models
(so-called toy models) were constructed for the detailed analysis of financial
markets. The representative ones can be listed as the percolation model [8,
9], Ising (spin) model [10, 11, 12, 13], Sznajd model [14], the grand canonical
Minority Game (GCMG) [15, 16, 17, 18], and so on. The findings from the
studies with these models revealed that the phenomenon volatility clustering
may be originated in the synchronization of traders, namely the herding behavior
1Nevertheless, the autocorrelation of volatility of times series data yielded by GARCH
decays exponentially [4].
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[19], which is the human tendency of following the actions of others 2.
Meanwhile, there remains a possibility that some other mechanisms can also
lead to the emergence of volatility clustering, considering that those toy models
might overlook other fundamental microstructures of the market. Furthermore,
although the inference of the contribution of herding behavior toward the irreg-
ular price bursts seems reasonable, it is hard to measure, even in a qualitative
sense, the degree and the extent of herding in the real financial markets. Hence,
it is natural and absolutely necessary to think about other potential mechanisms
working for the emergence of volatility clustering. In fact, Maslov model [21] has
revealed that the continuous double auction price formation system alone can
induce the presence of fat-tailed distribution and volatility clustering in price
fluctuations.
As a latent cause for the emergence of volatility clustering, we particularly
pay attention to the combination of round-trip trading and dynamic wealth
whose effects has not been clarified yet. While none of the introduced simple
models concerns these details seriously, there are some prior toy models equipped
with either one of the elements. For example, the concept of round-trip trans-
actions has been installed in the $-game [22] to evaluate trading strategies, but
they are not implemented in agents’ trading actions 3. Ferreira and Marsili [23]
introduced a round-trip trade mechanism into Minority Game, Majority Game
and $-game under the restriction of a successive two-step transaction. In the
pattern game [24], round-trip payoffs are incorporated by taking the reaction
time of order placement into account. As for the dynamical wealth with variable
trading volumes, there are extended GCMG models in which the wealth diver-
2GCMG, however, the reproduction of volatility clustering highly depends on the random
initialization of the strategy tables [20]. The autocorrelation of volatility shown in [15] is
indeed the failed case. Even when the volatility clustering turns up in this model, the tail
length of its positive autocorrelation may vary quite a lot (ranging from shorter than 50-time
lags to longer than 500-time lags).
3Although agent’s wealth in the $-game changes dynamically, her/his order size is kept
constant as one.
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sity and the varying investment sizes are considered [25]. Minority Game with
dynamical capital (MGDC) [26, 27] allows the fractional investment of agents
total capital. Note that dynamic capital is significant to bring on heavy tails of
price return, but it can hardly reproduce the distinctive volatility clustering in
MGDC without the inductive learning (see more details in Subsubsection 3.3.2).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that both the evolving money and the variable
order size are implemented in the Patzelt-Pawelzik model [28].
Based on these previous studies, we developed Speculation Game [29], which
is an adaptive agent model allowing both an explicit description of round-trip
trading and a dynamic evolution of traders’ wealth. In Speculation Game,
round-trip trading is defined as a trading process in which an agent, responding
to a set of signals received from the price movements, opens a position with
a buy/sell order first, and closes the position with the reverse order later. At
other times, agents either hold a position in the ongoing round-trip trade or
idle without any positions in the market. The sophistication of model building
renders Speculation Game prominent in reproducing 10 of 11 the well-known
stylized facts for financial time series [1] including the volatility clustering and
the heavy tails, which are most concerned in the development of a model for
the financial markets 4. Nevertheless, the detailed scenario of the emergence of
stylized facts in Speculation Game is not clarified yet because the enhancement
of reality also makes the analysis of model nontrivial.
In this paper, the detailed mechanisms for Speculation Game working on
the emergence of the volatility clustering is analyzed through a series of simula-
tion study. In particular, the built-up of heterogeneous distribution of traders’
wealth through the round-trip trades, together with the realization of variable
investment size, are revealed as another possible scenario for the emergence of
financial stylized facts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the main ingredient of Speculation Game, while the one after the next
4See [29] for the reproducibility of Speculation Game for other stylized facts.
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presents the emerging mechanism of volatility clustering. Finally, the last sec-
tion concludes the study.
2. Speculation Game
2.1. Model building
Speculation Game is a repeated game in which players compete with each
other to increase wealth by capital gains through round-trip trades. The model
was constructed by applying the structure of Minority Game [30, 31] including
history, memory, and strategy table for decision making of the players. More-
over, two more distinctive parameters, namely board lot amount and cognitive
threshold, are introduced to enable the players to place orders with variable
trading volumes and to allow the history to carry both information of the di-
rection and the magnitude of price change. Another unique point is that the
game proceeds with alternations between realistic and cognitive worlds 5, which
represents the human tendency in handling complex information through sim-
plification.
In Speculation Game, N players participate in a gamified market, with initial
market wealth and S strategy tables. At discrete time t, player i uses her best
strategy j∗ (∈ S) to take an action aj∗i (t) from three options, that is buy (= 1),
sell (= −1), or hold (idle) (= 0). When the player submits a buy or sell (short
selling is allowed) order following strategy j∗, the quantity of order qi(t) is
decided with her market wealth wi(t) and the board lot amount B, the latter
of which describes the ease in placing orders with multiple quantities,
qi(t) = bwi(t)
B
c, (1)
where b· · · c stands for the flooring operator. Note that the closing quantity qi(t)
is required to be the same as the opening one qi(t0) in a round-trip trade. Also,
the player’s initial market wealth wi(0) is decided with a uniformly distributed
5See Fig. 1 of [29] for further understanding of the framework.
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random number U [0, 100) as below to enable her to order one unit at least:
wi(0) = bB + U [0, 100)c. (2)
If the wealth of a player decreases an amount to wi(t) < B as a result of round-
trip trade, the player will be forced to leave the market and substituted by a
new player, whose market wealth is similarly decided according to Eq. 2.
Letting the initial asset price to be p(0) = 100, the market price change ∆p
is the order imbalance equation proposed in [8]:
∆p = p(t)− p(t− 1) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
aj
∗
i (t)qi(t). (3)
The quantized price movement h(t) is decided by the magnitude correlation
between the price change ∆p and the cognitive threshold C, the latter of which
is a threshold value used by the players to recognize a big price move:
h(t) =

2 (largely up) if ∆p > C,
1 (up) if C ≥ ∆p > 0,
0 (stay) if ∆p = 0,
−1 (down) if − C ≤ ∆p < 0,
−2 (largely down) if ∆p < −C.
(4)
Hence, the history H(t) is a quinary time series in the players’ cognitive world
recording the past price movements. To take an action according to the best
strategy aj
∗
i (t), the player with memory M at first take the reference of the
last M digits of history H(t). Next, she looks up strategy j∗ to obtain a rec-
ommended action corresponding to the historical pattern. However, when the
recommendation has no change from the opening order aj
∗
i (t0), the player will
hold the opened position. With such trading rules, the market signal based po-
sition open/close is enabled for the player to accomplish a round-trip trade with
a single position as well as the variable holding and idling periods. Note that the
constraint for the completion of round-trip trades also impedes the spontaneous
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synchronized actions among the players (i.e., the herding behavior) 6.
To determine the best strategy for the reference of next action, all the strate-
gies are evaluated through virtual round-trip trades in the background similarly
to the way applied to the strategy in use. Performances of the strategies are as-
sessed in terms of the accumulated strategy gains Gji (t) (j ∈ S) calculated with
the cognitive price P (t) corresponding to the quantized information. Letting
P (0) = 0, P (t) is updated as
P (t) = P (t− 1) + h(t). (5)
The gain of strategy j in a round-trip trade ∆Gji (t) can read as
∆Gji (t) = a
j
i (t0)(P (t)− P (t0)), (6)
and the accumulated strategy gain Gji (t) is measured by:
Gji (t) = G
j
i (t0) + ∆G
j
i (t). (7)
Whenever the accumulated gain of the strategy in use Gj
∗
i (t) is updated, all the
accumulated strategy gains Gji (t) will be reviewed to renew strategy j
∗ with
the best performed one. If the renewed best strategy happens to be one of the
unused strategies with which a virtual trade is ongoing, the virtual position will
be closed immediately (i.e., the virtual round-trip trade is aborted forthwith)
before the player switches to this new best strategy at the next time step.
Note that the evaluating system is developed by considering that the investing
strategies should be evaluated with capital gains and losses by round-trip trades,
as Katahira and Akiyama pointed out [32].
Since the self-financing assumption is not made in Speculation Game, when
a round-trip trade is closed, the player’s market wealth wi(t) is updated with
an investment adjustment ∆wi(t), which is the conversion of strategy gain into
market gain by taking the trading volume qi(t) into consideration,
wi(t) = wi(t0) + ∆wi(t) = wi(t0) + f(∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0)). (8)
6See Appendix A in [29] for further details.
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Here f can be an arbitrary function. In this study, ∆wi(t) = ∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0) is
used for the simplicity.
2.2. Phase diagram
Under specific parameter settings, Speculation Game will get into the ex-
treme state in which ∆p bursts irregularly with tremendous amplitudes 7. The
extreme state can be differentiated from the stable state by inspecting the M
(memory) - B (board lot amount) phase diagram of σ, where σ is the standard
deviation of market price change. Fig. 1 shows such a diagram, where the color
of circular dots represents 100-trial averaged σ in log scale. As either M or
B decreases, the standard deviation of ∆p increases monotonically. Especially
when M or B is critically reduced from three to two, standard deviation σ grows
drastically (more than two decades). Accordingly, dots in (pale ∼ vivid) blue
(M ≥ 3 ∩ B ≥ 3) can be defined as the stable states, while the rest of dots as
the extreme states (σ > 10).
Figure 1: The M -B phase diagram of averaged σ in log scale (N = 1, 000, S = 2, C = 3).
The color-bar numbers are exponents of a logarithm. The diagram is plotted from 100-trial
simulations with 50,000 iterations for each pair of parameters.
Since the volatility clustering emerges only in the stable states, we start
the analysis with the cases of M ≥ 3, particularly the comparison between the
7See Fig. B.1 in [29].
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cases of M = 5 and M = 7, in the next subsubsection. Note that the simulation
results along different M shown in the following sections are obtained with the
rest parameters fixed as N = 1, 000, S = 2, B = 9, C = 3. Discussion on the
effects of different values of these parameters can be found in the Appendices.
3. Emergence of volatility clustering
3.1. The role of wealth distribution
3.1.1. Placement of big orders
The appearance of time series r(t)(= ln(p(t))− ln(p(t− 1))) looks quite dif-
ferent depending on the value of M , in particular, the volatility clusters present
more manifestly with smaller M . In the case of M = 5, the intermittent burst
of time series r(t) is displayed in panel (a) of Fig. 2. In the case of M = 7, large
fluctuations in r(t) are absent, see panel (a) of Fig. 3. This distinctive charac-
teristics comes from the size of orders. Time series of the number of orders in
different sizes are shown in panels (b)∼(d) of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 correspondingly.
Big orders plotted in panel (b) are classified as qi(t) > 100, medium orders in
panel (c) as 50 < qi(t) ≤ 100, and small orders in panel (d) as qi(t) ≤ 50. As
Fig. 2 shows, in the case of M = 5, big and medium orders turn up at times
when r(t) fluctuates largely, while the number of small orders is almost constant
just below N/2. In contrast, in the case of M = 7, as it can be confirmed in
Fig. 3, no distinguishable intermittent augmentations of big and medium orders
can be found, whereas there is no big change regarding the incessant presence
of small orders. The only exception is the existence of the sparse vacant points
without any order placements in the case of M = 5.
These results indicate that the relatively big and medium order placements
play a key role in the emergence of volatility clustering. According to Eq. 1, the
quantity of order qi(t) is decided proportionally by the player’s market wealth
wi(t), which means that a wealthier player would place an order with a bigger
trading volume. In other words, the intermittent time series of price returns
implies the ample existence of wealthier players when M gets smaller.
9
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 2: Time series of (a) market returns and of the number of (b) big orders, (c) medium
orders, and (d) small orders in the case of M = 5.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 3: Time series of (a) market returns and of the number of (b) big orders, (c) medium
orders, and (d) small orders in the case of M = 7.
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3.1.2. Appearance of rich players
This implication of activities of rich players can be verified from a different
aspect if one takes a snapshot of wealth distribution among the players after
the elapse of a transition period for the system. Fig. 4 is the log-log plot of
averaged complementary cumulative distributions of wealth at t = 50, 000 in
cases of M = 5 (blue asterisk dots) and M = 7 (red square dots), and the cases
of M = 2 (purple triangle dots) and M = 3 (orange cross dots) for a further
comparison 8. As Fig. 4 shows, the blue colored distribution has a fatter tail
than the red one has, meaning a larger number of rich players exists in the case
of M = 5 than that in the case of M = 7. In other words, repetitions of the
round-trip trades performed with a smaller M would spontaneously generate a
wider distribution of wealth among players 9. This observation also applies to
the cases of M = 2 and M = 3 as the fatter tails of purple and orange dots show.
Based on results in Figs. 2 - 4, one can say that the growth of volatility is brought
by those wealthier players placing orders with big and medium quantities.
Note that the complementary cumulative distribution of wealth in the case
of M = 5 follows Pareto’s law [33] with a tail index α = 1.94, which is indicated
by the green line in Fig. 4. The lower cut-off of asymptotic power-law function
is decided as xmin = 137 by the “poweRlaw” package [34], developed by Clauset,
Shalizi, and Newman [35].
3.1.3. Empirical evidence
Pareto’s distribution of wealth even holds in the actual financial market as
shown in Fig. 5, which is the log-log plot of complementary cumulative distri-
butions of total discretionary assets under management (AUM) of the world’s
500 largest asset managers in 2017. The AUM data is taken from the report
done by Willis Towers Watson [36]. The lower cut-off of this asymptotic power-
law function (xmin = 8, 914) is also found with the “poweRlaw” package [34].
8See Appendix A for the time series plots of returns and order placements in different sizes
in the cases of M = 2 and M = 3.
9Smaller B could also widen the wealth disparity among players. See Appendix B.
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Figure 4: A snapshot of averaged wealth distributions at t = 50, 000. These distributions
are obtained from 100 trials of the simulation. States of system may be described more
distinctively by the tail conditions of players’ wealth such as stable state (M = 7: a deflated
tail), critical state (M = 5: a power-law tail), super-critical state (M = 3: an inflated tail),
and extreme state (M = 2: a super-inflated tail).
The red line is a fitted power-law function with α = 1.54 (α = 0.689 when
the vertical axis is the number of asset managers), whereas the green dashed
line is a fitted exponential function. The goodness-of-fit test [35] gives p-value
as 0.58, which is greater than 0.1, indicating that the power law is a plausible
hypothesis for the data. Vuong’s test [37] also concludes that the power-law dis-
tribution is the closer fitting as the likelihood ratio LR is 5.57 and the p-value
is 2.58× 10−8, which is less than 0.1. The AUM data of Willis Towers Watson
in 2011, 2015 and 2016 [38, 39, 40] displays similar results although total AUM
expands overall as time goes by.
In addition, the emerging mechanism of the volatility clustering found in
Speculation Game is also supported by the study of Plerou and Stanley regard-
ing trade size [41]. The authors analyzed tick-by-tick data for three distinct
markets: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the London Stock Exchange
(LSE), and the Paris Bourse, and reported that the complementary cumulative
distribution of individual trading size q displays a power-law tail with the tail
exponent ζq as shown in Fig. 6. The slow decay of trade size in this figure im-
13
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Figure 5: Complementary cumulative distributions of AUM of the world’s 500 largest asset
managers in 2017. The scale is in US$ millions.
plies the existence of a certain number of cash-laden investors. Since ζq is close
to α shown in Fig. 5, the power-law nature of trade size seems to be originated
from that of AUM.
3.2. The role of round-trip trading
3.2.1. The horizon of round-trip trades
The reason why such wealthy players can emerge in Speculation Game is
related to the trading horizon (or holding period) in the round-trip trades. Fig.
7 displays the averaged occurrences of strategy gain resulted from round-trip
trades accomplished by all the participated players in the case of M = 5. Dot
color denote those frequencies in the log scale. As shown in Fig. 7, round-
trip trades with longer horizons can generate more diverse values of strategy
gain, which means that a player tends to win or lose bigger as the horizon of
a round-trip trade gets longer. The important point here is the fact that those
big losers will either leave (more precisely, be withdrawn from) the market with
a high probability or only have scarce wealth even if survived. Thus, the tail of
wealth distribution in Fig. 4 is built by the wealth of those bigger winners in
the round-trip trades.
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Figure 6: Complementary cumulative distribution of the trade size for NYSE (US data),
LSE, and Paris Bourse cited from the analysis of Plerou and Stanley [41]. The data for each
stock have been scaled by its median. Power-law regressions give ζq = 1.55 ± 0.04 (NYSE),
1.73± 0.02 (LSE), and 1.60± 0.03 (Paris Bourse).
Figure 7: The relationship between the strategy gain and the horizon of a round-trip trade
along the averaged frequencies in log scale in the case of M = 5. The color-bar numbers
indicate the logarithmic exponents. The plot is drawn based on the results of round-trip
trades completed by all the players from the 100-trials of simulations.
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The log-log plot of averaged distributions of trading horizon are shown in
Fig. 8, which displays that the memory size of players affects the horizons of
round-trip trades they make. As the figure shows, the blue colored dots have a
more spread tail than the red ones have, meaning a greater number of longer
trades are made in the case of M = 5 than those made in the case of M = 7.
Hence, the smaller M the players have, the longer the horizon of a round-trip
trade lasts. The situations of M = 2 and M = 3 denote the same tendency. The
wideness of horizon distributions in Fig. 8 corresponds well to that of wealth
distributions in Fig. 4. Accordingly, one can conclude that longer round-trip
trades would cause the widening of the wealth distribution because of their
higher-risk and higher-return nature.
Figure 8: The distributions of averaged round-trip trade horizons. These distributions are
obtained from round-trip trades completed by all the players from the 100-trials of simulations.
3.2.2. Empirical evidence
The diversified values of strategy gain with longer round-trip trades shown
in Fig. 7 is in accordance with the empirical analysis done by Massachusetts
Financial Services (MFS) [42]. As shown in Fig. 9, MFS reports that the greater
return dispersion can be observed as the investment horizon extends, meaning
that there are more opportunities for differentiated performance when one holds
securities for longer time periods.
16
Figure 9: The growth of return dispersion with time cited from the analysis of MFS [42].
3.2.3. Hold actions
The cause of longer trading horizon with smaller M lies with more hold
actions taken by the players. In Speculation Game, there are two types of
hold action. One type is the active hold, which is the action a player directly
chooses as what her strategy recommends. The other type is the passive hold,
which is the action a player switches to from a prohibited buy or sell action.
The prohibition of trade activates when the action recommended by the trading
strategy happens to be the same as the one in the opening of position, in order to
ensure the completion of a round-trip trade. Fig. 10 is the averaged accumulated
stick bar graph denoting the statistics of actions among such two types of hold,
buy, and sell for all the players along with different memory sizes. As Fig. 10
shows, both the ratios of active and passive holds increase as the memory size of
players decreases, which correlates to the increment in horizon of a round-trip.
Precisely speaking, the ratio of passive hold grows a little larger, indicating
the increase of passive hold has a greater effect on making the trading horizon
longer.
It is worth mentioning that, even though the recommendations in strategy
tables are generated in a pure random manner, ratios of the four kinds of actions
are not balanced especially in the smaller M cases, which indicates the loss of
the ergodicity in the system. If the system is ergodic, the summed ratio of
passive hold, buy and sell should be double to the ratio of active hold , as the
lager M cases shown in Fig. 10.
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Figure 10: The averaged 100% stacked column chart of four-type actions. This bar graph is
drawn from all actions taken by all players from 100-trial simulations.
3.3. Other factors
3.3.1. Signal dependency
The non-uniformity in the ratio of trading actions is related to the fact that
Speculation Game is a highly signal dependent game. If the genuine historical
pattern were not employed, the game would not work properly. In contrast, an
exogenous random history works well in Minority Game as long as it is common
to all the participants of the game [43]. In Fig. 11(a), a time series generated
by Speculation Game while employing the exogenous histories is shown. It is
obvious that the data does not contain any clustered temporal structures, which
also supports findings from the Patzelt-Pawelzik model which states that, only
the endogenously generated news (history), rather than the external one, can
account for the large price fluctuations [28]. Another demonstration of the
failure in the generation of volatility clustering is the case in which a round-trip
trade was randomly opened with a probability p = 0.5 without referencing the
price history as well as the current position. As panel (b) of Fig. 11 displays,
similarly to the result in panel (a), there is no evidence for the intermittent
burst of price fluctuations. From these demonstrations, one can conclude that
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the decision-making process of players for the round-trip trading, which results
in the nonergodic actions, is indispensable to generate the volatility clusteringin
Speculation Game. In fact, round-trip trading can also generate distinctive
historical patterns of price returns in Speculation Game, which will be detailed
in our future report.
(a)
(b)
Figure 11: Time series of market returns in the cases (a) when an external common history
is randomly given and (b) when a buy or sell position is randomly opened with p = 0.5
(N = 1, 000, M = 5, S = 2, B = 9, C = 3).
3.3.2. Inductive learing
Lastly, it should be remarked that the structure of round-trip trading could
be a sole crucial factor for the emergence of volatility clustering. In Minority
Game typed models, the inductive learning is needed for the elicitation of herd-
ing behavior among agents. If agents owned only one strategy, the function of
inductive learning would not work in these models. As a typical example, in
MGDC[27] (an extended Minority Game model equipped with dynamic capital
and variable investments) with a single strategy table for each agent, the slow
19
decay of autocorrelation in volatility measured by
ρv(τ) = Corr(|r(t+ τ)|, |r(t)|), (9)
where |r(t)| is volatility and τ is the time lag, will be absent due to the loss
of adaptivity derived from the inductive learning. As panel (a) of Fig. 12
shown, the autocorrelation in volatility drops immediately to the noise level in
MGDC with a single trading strategy (S = 1) for each player. To recover its
reproducibility, MGDC agents typically need more than one trading strategy to
grant their adaptability for the dynamical market circumstances [26].
On the contrary, inductive learning is not indispensable for the recovery
of long-range autocorrelation of volatility in Speculation Game. Even in the
case when players behave mechanically, namely S = 1, the autocorrelation of
volatility decays slowly similar to the cases of S ≥ 2, as the log-log plot in panel
(b) of Fig. 12 displays 10. The remarkable gap between Fig. 12(a) and Fig.
12(b) elucidates the importance of round-trip trading itself in Speculation Game
for the emergence of long-range autocorrelation of volatility. More explicitly
speaking, while a combination of defined round-trip trading and dynamic wealth
is enough for the reproduction of those stylized facts in Speculation Game, an
employment of inductive learning and evolving capital is essentially needed in
those Minority Game type models.
4. Conclusion
The analysis of Speculation Game with the simulations and the data from
the actual financial markets illustrates that the emergence of volatility cluster-
ing can be induced by the relatively big and medium order placements from the
activated rich players, when the market environment is suitable for an appropri-
ate number of such players. The spontaneous redistribution of market wealth
through repetitions of round-trip trades widens the wealth disparity among the
10See Appendix C for the effect of S as well as C on ∆p.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 12: (a) The absence of autocorrelation in volatility in MGDC in the case of S = 1.
The rest parameters are set as P = 260, Ns = 401, Np = 401,  = 0.01 by referring [26] and
[27]. (b) The slow decay of autocorrelation in volatility in Speculation Game in the case of
S = 1 (N = 1, 000, M = 5, B = 9, C = 3). The decay can be regressed to a logarithmic
function: ρv(τ) = −0.062ln(τ) + 0.433 (R2 = 0.951), as the green line shows.
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players and form a heterogeneous distribution, which can be regarded as another
possible origin (other than the herding behavior) of the volatility clustering in
the price return. This result is in accordance with the thinking elucidated in the
previous study [44], which states that fractal structures in stock price change
are caused actually by that rich and poor traders make decisions essentially in
the same way even though they place very different amounts of trading unit.
Furthermore, factors influencing the wealth disparity, such as the relationship
between the strategy gain and the trading horizon in a round-trip trade, the
significance of active and passive holds for the nonergodic decision making,
and the strong dependency of the system on the genuine historical signals, are
clarified. Finally, the comparison with MGDC reveals that the structure of
round-trip trading is the critical element for Speculation Game to reproduce
the long-range autocorrelation of volatility.
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Appendix A. Time series in the cases of M = 2 and M = 3
In the case of M = 2, the system frequently reaches the extreme state
involving tremendous bursts of market return r(t) as the panel (a) of Fig. A.1
displays. These bursts are brought by a great number of extremely large order
volumes. As the purple dots (M = 2) show in Fig. 4, the wealth of some players
can even reach 105. Those super wealthy players place enormous quantities
because there is no limitation for trading volumes. Moreover, there are overall
much more big (and medium) orders throughout the simulation, as shown in
the panel (b) (and (c)) of Fig. A.1. Lastly, the most distinctive characteristic of
the extreme state is the alternative appearances of constant decrease and rapid
recovery in small orders, as shown in the panel (d) of Fig. A.1.
In the case of M = 3, the market return r(t) exhibits much stronger clus-
tering of volatilities in comparison with the case of M = 5 as the panel (a) of
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure A.1: Time series of (a) market returns and of the number of (b) big orders, (c) medium
orders, and (d) small orders in the case of M = 2 (N = 1, 000, S = 2, B = 9, C = 3). The
initial market price is set as p(0) = 10, 000 to calculate r(t).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure A.2: Time series of (a) market returns and of the number of (b) big orders, (c) medium
orders, and (d) small orders in the case of M = 3 (N = 1, 000, S = 2, B = 9, C = 3).
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Fig. A.2 displays. This is also due to the existence of larger number of wealthier
players (see the orange dots in Fig. 4), which could result in more placements of
big and medium orders through the whole time periods, as shown in the panel
(b) and (c) of Fig. A.2. The incessant presence of small orders can be observed
but with a bit more fluctuations and more vacant points (the panel (d) of Fig.
A.2) than in the cases of M = 5 and M = 7.
Appendix B. The wider wealth disparity with smaller B
Smaller B, meaning more liquidity with the easier placement of multiple
quantities, can also widen the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.
The wealth inequality among players can be measured by the Gini coefficient,
which is defined as follows,
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(u)du, (B.1)
where L(u) is the Lorenz curve [45]. Fig. B.3 is a snapshot of 100-trial averaged
Gini coefficient calculated at t = 50, 000 with various values of B. In Fig. B.3,
G increases as B decreases, meaning smaller B widens the wealth differential
among players, which corresponds to the increase of σ with the reduction of
B in Fig. 1. Moreover, in the cases of B < 3, the growth rate of G increases
dramatically, corresponding with the market price change in the extreme states.
Namely, without any limitation for the trading volumes, the excessive liquidity
can collapse the system as the extreme state reached.
Appendix C. The roiling effect of S and C
A larger number of strategy would weaken the intensity of clustered volatility
and makes the tails of ∆p distribution less heavy. The heaviness of tails can be
measured by the kurtosis of market price change, which is defined as
κ =
〈(∆p(t)− 〈∆p(t)〉)4〉
σ4
− 3. (C.1)
25
Figure B.3: The relationship between B and the 100-trial averaged Gini coefficient at t =
50, 000 (N = 1, 000, M = 5, S = 2, C = 3).
Fig. C.4 shows the relationship between S and the 100-trial averaged κ, in-
dicating κ decreases as S increases. This is because that larger S could raise
the possibility of switching the strategy in use, which would further induce a
stronger scrambling effect on market conditions. In other words, a greater num-
ber of strategy switching can accelerate the change of market states and make
players more difficult to gain profits through round-trip trades, thus render the
emergence of big players harder. Meanwhile, the degree of market roiling can be
measured by the statistics of the time-averaged total market wealth of all play-
ers through the whole period, as the dot color in Fig. C.4 displays. The gradual
transition of dot colors from red to blue indicates that the time-averaged total
market wealth decreases as S becomes bigger, which validates the increase of
difficulty to make money through round-trip trades. Note this result resembles
the results obtained in Minority Game which shows that a greater number of
strategies (or a higher switching rate of strategies) lowers the success rate [30];
A smaller cognitive threshold C can also suppress large fluctuations, so that
the averaged κ decreases as C decreases in Fig. C.5. According to the definition
of C in Eq. 4, when C is smaller, histories including the signals of 2 and −2
appear more frequently and the corresponding trading recommendations in the
strategy tables are activated more frequently. Hence, the cognitive threshold
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Figure C.4: The decay of averaged kurtosis of ∆p as S increases (N = 1, 000, M = 5, B = 9,
C = 3). The dot color shows the time-averaged total market wealth of all players. The plot
is based on the 100-trials of simulations.
can roil the market like the cases of higher strategy switching rate. Indeed,
the time-averaged total market wealth decreases as C decreases, as the gradual
change of dot colors in Fig. C.5 shows.
Figure C.5: The growth of averaged kurtosis of ∆p as C increases (N = 1, 000, M = 5, S = 2,
B = 9). The dot color shows the time-averaged total market wealth of all players. The plot
is based on the 100-trials of simulations.
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